[2026 kcdc] mitre att&ck for developers

Speaker: Chris Ayers

See live blog table of contents for more posts


Slides/github: https://github.com/codebytes/mitre-attack-for-devs

Security has changed in last 5 years

  • Patch Tuesday has about a thousand patches. That is about as many as all of last year!
  • MS authenticator – have to type a number vs just clicking approve
  • Growing attack surface – ex: cloud
  • Sophisticated adversaries – nation-states, organized crime, insider threats. Water treatment plans
  • Complex attack chains – multiple techniques chained togehter
  • Traditional defenses – focus on single points of failure
  • Goal today is to protected identity, session and data access

OWASP

  • renamed from Open Web Application Security Project to Open Worldwide Application Security Project
  • community driven security standards
  • top 10
  • vulnerability classification, remediation guidance, prevention focus
  • Focuses on vulnerabilities from point of view of what breaks. Looks at application layer
  • Should use both OWSP and ATT&CK

MITRE ATT&CK

  • MITRE came out of the military.
  • Not community driven
  • Knowledge base
  • 14 tactics, 200+ techniques, 400_ sub techniques
  • Derived from actual cyber attacks and threat intelligence
  • MITRE also does CVEs, ATLAS (ML threats)
  • Focuses on adversary behavior from point of view of what attackers do. Looks at adversary-informed defense across entire attack lifecycle
  • More specific

ATT*CK

https://attack.mitre.org

  • Tactics – focus on the “why” of the attack
  • Techniques – how the attack happens (ex: spear phishing)
  • Sub-techniques – ex: spear phishing over email
  • Procedures – real world examples

Real world

  • Kill chain is not linear
  • Loop backs, paralel activities
  • “crooked line”

Solar winds

  • Backdoor into signed update
  • DDL executes
  • SAML credential threat
  • Command and control via DNS blending
  • Data exit over C2

Initial Access and Credential Attacks

  • Make access decisions explicit
  • SQL Injection vs parameterized queries
    • Detect credential stuffing – too many request too quckly from same IP

Execution and Command injection

  • Command injection vs command whitelisting
  • Unsafe deserialization

Persistence & Session Hijacking

  • Vulnerable session management – that last forever
  • Web shell detection – looking for extension isn’t enough. if do prevew can run JavaScript

Credential Access & Secrets

  • Try to use managed identity instead
  • Rotate secrets; better to use short lived tokens
  • Use key vault
  • Don’t put api keys/tokens in source code
  • GitHub alerts if check in a key to public repo. Can auto expire the checked in token. Even cleaning history not enough because people can subscribe to commits. Need to protected with pre-commit hook on your machine

Defense Evasion & Log Tampering

  • Correlate logs from different sources
  • Log injection
  • Tamper evident logging

Supply chain compromise

  • Malicous packages,
  • event-stream, solarwinds, log4shell, xz utils, sai hulud, notepad+, axios, etc
  • 2021 – Log4Shell was a dependency trust failure. It waa bug. People didn’t know if using because used other things that included. Also needed SBOM for own software.
  • 2024 – XZ Utils – 2 year long con.- “Jian Tan” submitted first patch in 2021. Sock pullets pressure maintainer so Jia becomes co-maintainer. Backdoor in tarballs only in 2024. Found March 29th by accident because SSH was 500ms slower from a Microsoft researcher looking at PostGres performance. Goal was to get this into Fedora so in next major release of Red Hat Linux.
  • 2025 – NotePad++ update hijack – We hosting infrastructure compromised. Web host trojanied the update.exe by adding a side loaded (loading malicious file) DLL.
  • 2026 – Axios NPM Compromise – March 31 for 3 hours there was an extra dependency with a remote access trojan. The post install script downloaded software to allow remote access. It was just a patch release so not looked at closely.

Patching is more than deploying

  • Patch the dependency -> inventory affected services
  • Restart the service -> Verify the critical workflows
  • Close the ticket -> check for prior compromise

Collection & Exfiltration

  • 2015 – anthem – slowly stole data over http request
  • 2022 – LastPass – stole tokens targetting developer’s home PC
  • Helpful to have baseline statistic on how much data usually have so know when unusual
  • API rate limiting with exfil detection

MITRE website

  • Multiple matrixes
  • Can read about details of attacks such as detection/mitigations.

My take

THere were lots of examples including technique names/numbers. I feel like I got a good feel for ATT&CK. I also poked at https://attack.mitre.org as well to get a feel for what it looks like. A lot of different items shown as well both as code and as mapping to ATT&CK. And the recent events examples.

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